When going into Iraq, the president could countenance no pessimism about what might happen. Now, as the nation considers withdrawal, it seems he can countenance no optimism. The latest meme, touched on in the SOTU address, is that a U.S. departure from Iraq will embolden the terrorists, allow for an expanded base of Al Qaeda operations, and will, in the words of the president, “put our security at risk”.
This line of reasoning is often accompanied by a harkening back to our defeat in Vietnam, and the subsequent communist takeovers in Cambodia, Laos, and several African nations. Leave Iraq, we are warned, and we’ll be forced to watch the dominos fall.
The admonition is defective. It implies that the United States and Al Qaeda in Iraq are the only players on the global stage, locked in a zero-sum battle for control and influence. It ignores other nations and populations and how their behavior might change in the event of jihadist successes in Iraq.
In the aftermath of Vietnam, the United States did experience a loss of perceived power and several states were taken over by Soviet-tilting, Marxist regimes. However, this produced its own counter-veiling reaction. The heightened international concerns about expanding Soviet influence resulted in, among other things, the shifting of China into the U.S. strategic camp.
This same dynamic holds true in the current struggle against Al Qaeda and its clones. Should the United States leave Iraq it could find itself with more, and surprisingly vigorous, allies in the war on terror, mitigating the sting of not achieving the preferred results in Iraq.
For example, a U.S withdraw could incentivize the Shiite government to fight Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents with greater urgency, given the inability to free ride on American power. And, its troops might prove to be surprisingly effective, fighting with more tactical ruthlessness, better intelligence, and a better understanding of the enemy than coalition forces.
Should the Shiite government collapse after an American withdrawal, “an epic battle between Shia extremists backed by Iran, and Sunni extremists aided by al Qaeda and supporters of the old regime” could ensue, in the words of the president; a prospect he labeled the “nightmare scenario”. Apparently, for this president, our enemies are not allowed to flight Al Qaeda. In reality, this scenario would be a nightmare for Sunni insurgents, including Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Should the motley mix of Sunni insurgents, one way or another, gain an independent, defensible stronghold in central Iraq, it’s quite possible that Sunni nationalists, Baathists and moderates would all turn on Al Qaeda. The marriage between these factions is founded on animosity toward Americans and Shiites. Should America leave, and the conflict with the Shia end, the foreign Sunni jihadists could find themselves marginalized or worse.
Moreover, should the Iraqi government, Shiite militias, and indigenous Sunni elements all fail to temper foreign jihadists, and should Al Qaeda gain a stronghold akin to what they had in Afghanistan, it would set off another layer of counterveiling reaction. Iran would make every effort to undermine such a stronghold, and might find assistance from other states in the region. The greater the threat such a base of terror operations posed, the greater would be the resistance to it.
Should local regimes fail to blunt a hypothetical Sunni terrorist stronghold in Iraq, and should radical, Qaeda-affiliated Islamists actually expand and take over in say, Jordan or Egypt, it would provoke a still more powerful reaction, not just from Tehran and Washington, but from Ankara, Europe, and perhaps many other corners, galvanizing all to isolate the radical Islamic states. The greater the threat that such states posed, the greater would be the resistance. And the less involved the United States was in spearheading the anti-Al Qaeda efforts, the greater would be the efforts from others.
The number of scenarios involving a check on Sunni-terrorist power are myriad, and far more probable than the dire warnings from the administration of an unmitigated expansion of Al Qaeda once our troops have come home.
This is the ironic reality of balance-of-power politics from which the world has not escaped. The United States will thus always find itself in one of two less than ideal situations: Increasingly hegemonic and successful in its fight against terrorists, but with a shrinking list of friends and remarkable amounts of opposition, OR waning in influence and projection, but with a growing list of friends, improved international public standing, and more help in the war on terror.
We encountered the former in spades in 2002 and 2003, when the nation was at a zenith of power, having rapidly dispatched with the Taliban. The decision of the United States to project itself further provoked: intransigence from Russia, China and France in the Security Council, anti-American elections in Germany, Italy, Spain, South Korea, and Latin America, and a global tide of hostile public opinion toward the American superpower. One wonders how the world would have reacted had things actually gone as planned in Iraq.
Now that America has been humbled, we’re beginning see the ironic but predictable turnabout of international attitudes, despite the chaos we’re responsible for unleashing. We may be as pleasantly surprised by the global support we’ll accumulate on the way out as we were by the intense resistance we experienced on the way in.
This doesn’t mean that support for our nation and its ideals will always be deterministically inversely related to our strength. A strong reputation, with a government and society worth emulating can soften international hostility toward the projection of American power, and encourage the spread of our most cherished values. This is soft power at work, and that soft power is compromised by our presence in Iraq, particularly when it involves episodes like Abu Ghraib.
Moreover, the character of our enemies and the global perception of the threat that they and their ideologies pose to others will determine the level of help we get in the struggle against Islamic terror. If we have faith in our values and the universal benefits of our way of life, and confidence in the obvious failing of the ideologies of our enemies, then we should always have room for optimism.
Thursday, January 25, 2007
Monday, January 22, 2007
The 2008 Oracle: Dems
Who has the best chance of capturing the 2008 Democratic nomination? If you're interested in the windom of the crowds, you can try web sites that allow anyone to vote online, like this one. dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd
Given the strong biases inherent in these online polls, I'd put more stock in opinion meters that ask people to put their money where their mouths are, like the Iowa Electronic Markets. Unfortunately, there doesn't appear to be a market set up yet for party nominees, just Dems. vs. Reps. in the general election.
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd
You can also glean something from respected polls, although polls this early are mainly gaging name recognition. Here's a cross section of expert opinions from Markos Moulitsas, Chris Cillizza of the Washington Post and the folks and Politcal Derby. All spend plenty of time pondering one of the questions du jour for political junkies. The order the candidates are listed in?: my own assessment of the current odds.
ddddd
Future version of the Oracle will expand the list of experts. dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd
-------------------------Daily Kos--___--- WaPo---_-_-- Political Derby
Hillary ------------------3 ---------------1------------------1
Obama ------------------1----------------3-----------------2
Edwards ----------------2---------------2------------------3
dddd
Biden --------------------7---------------6 (tie)-----------6
ddd
Vilsack-------------------8---------------5------------------5
ddd
Vilsack-------------------8---------------5------------------5
ddd
Richardson-------------4---------------4------------------4
ddd
Kerry ------------------- 6 -------------- - ---- ----------- 9 (tie)
dddd
Clark --------------------5 ---------------- ---------------- 8
dddd
Dodd -------------------10 --------------6 (tie)-----------7
dddd
Kucinich --------------11 -------------------------------- 9 (tie)
They Don't Work for Me
Only two months ago, the DailyKos caused quite a stir when Markos suggested that libertarian types vote Democratic in the 2006 elections, and even encouraged the cultivation a long-term political alliance. The reaction was piqued interest from marketeers, along with some nervous scoffing from the GOP machine.
The high hurdle of strengthening this alliance is made all too clear with posts like this morning’s from Kos, celebrating the formation of a lobbying and campaign group, "They work for us", designed to “target” Democrats who are not sufficiently Lou Dobbsian enough on trade (its bad), wage controls (they’re good), and creditors who collect debts (that’s bad).
This effort is designed at creating another litmus test for Democrats, one that labels party members traitors if they seem to express any affinity whatsoever for a market economy. While Ellen Taucher is named as a primary target, the unstated desire seems to be to launch attacks on New Democrats and, in short, to recast the party in a pre-Clinton, pre Al Gore – Ross Perot NAFTA debate, kind of way.
Certainly this will not help the Democratic party. In fact, if I were a Republican donor with a strategic mind, this would be the ideal type of organization to bankroll. It will not only sew intra-party division, it will actively hinder the Democratic party’s ability to reach out to new, disaffected constituencies who now identify more with the GOP.
What’s more, this group is promoting some very wrong-headed public policy. Instead of simply hearing more appeals for intellectual conformity, organization building, and donations on DailyKos, we Democrats could use a lot more internal debate about major issues. We’re supposed to be in favor of economic salvation through huge tariff barriers? How about some rigorous thinking about what that actually means in practice. Al Gore explained it to us back in 1993. And he was right.
The high hurdle of strengthening this alliance is made all too clear with posts like this morning’s from Kos, celebrating the formation of a lobbying and campaign group, "They work for us", designed to “target” Democrats who are not sufficiently Lou Dobbsian enough on trade (its bad), wage controls (they’re good), and creditors who collect debts (that’s bad).
This effort is designed at creating another litmus test for Democrats, one that labels party members traitors if they seem to express any affinity whatsoever for a market economy. While Ellen Taucher is named as a primary target, the unstated desire seems to be to launch attacks on New Democrats and, in short, to recast the party in a pre-Clinton, pre Al Gore – Ross Perot NAFTA debate, kind of way.
Certainly this will not help the Democratic party. In fact, if I were a Republican donor with a strategic mind, this would be the ideal type of organization to bankroll. It will not only sew intra-party division, it will actively hinder the Democratic party’s ability to reach out to new, disaffected constituencies who now identify more with the GOP.
What’s more, this group is promoting some very wrong-headed public policy. Instead of simply hearing more appeals for intellectual conformity, organization building, and donations on DailyKos, we Democrats could use a lot more internal debate about major issues. We’re supposed to be in favor of economic salvation through huge tariff barriers? How about some rigorous thinking about what that actually means in practice. Al Gore explained it to us back in 1993. And he was right.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Minimum Wedge
On January 10th, the new Democratic Congress passed a bill to raise the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 and hour, on a 315-116 vote. For the Democrats, politically, this was a no-brainer. Polls show that roughly 76% to 85% of the general public favor raising the minimum wage. Among registered Democrats, the support is around 94%.
Not surprisingly, all House Democrats voted for the bill, with none raising any concerns about its implications. Moreover, 82 Republicans, or just over 40% of House GOPers supported the hike as well. It’s an article of faith, not just amongst the progressive left, but broad segments of the public, that one of the greatest mechanisms for improving the living standards of the working poor is through government legislation of a wage floor.
Unfortunately, it is also long-standing conventional wisdom among the broad majority of economists that minimum wage laws can result in structural unemployment.
When wage floors are set below what low-wage workers already earn, they have no real consequence one way or the other. They cause no harm, but also provide no real benefits, either. When wages are set above what low-wage earners, however, then the minimum wage starts to make a difference, for better or for worse. Some clearly benefit from the higher salary. For other workers, however, there can be unintended consequences, as standard economic theory suggests that jobs at the low end are ultimately shed when mandated wages exceed market wages.
In 1997, however, two economists David Card and Andrew Kruger, questioned this aforementioned basic economic conventional wisdom in Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage. They suggested that in their New Jersey case study, a higher minimum wage did not lead to an increase in unemployment.
Since then, their work has been criticized, but also routinely cited by wage hike advocates. Some activists have gone so far in their advocacy of intervention in labor markets as to suggest that it is “proven” that minimum wage laws can be raised ever upward with no negative consequences. In a recent radio interview, Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT), without citing Card-Kruger, argued that minimum wages are a scientifically proven, unalloyed good.
This optimistic notion, however, was slammed by Paul Krugman in 1998, who countered that at high enough levels wage floors are certain to do damage. He even scrutinized and questioned their rationale altogether. Meanwhile, economist Brad DeLong walks the fence. He supports minimum wage laws, but simultaneously acknowledges their potential to hinder employment. In a blog post last Sunday, he argued approvingly for the minimum wage hike but suggested that policy makers, “Try not to push it to the point where its drawbacks grow too large.” Unfortunately, DeLong offers no advice or guidance on how much is too much. Most economists, meanwhile, are with Krugman.
A recent story in the Washington Post, for example, noted that Congress, “brushed aside some corporate concerns” to pass the new minimum wage. The inference here is that only behemoth corporations had anything to lose from wage hikes, and that only elites at behemoth corporations have raised any intellectual objections.
Coverage like this helps to convince activists that government economic controls come free of side effects, and also nutures the image of a zero sum game battle between the working public and “corporations” over wages, work hours, sick leave, vacations, medical leave, heathcare benefits and pensions.
So why don’t we see even higher minimum wages? Steven Slivinski of the Cato Institute has an interesting and plausible theory as to why policy makers widely favor minimum wage floors, but stop at say, $7.25 per hour rather than going up to $20 an hour. He speculates that minimum wages only make politicians wary when they start to approach the market wages in their own Districts. When tiny hikes are proposed, only a few politicians in low cost of living areas object. As the rate moves higher, however, more and more object until a near majority feel threatened by the rate, and the proposed hike goes no higher.
Slivinksi suggests that if politicians were required to index the minimum wage to the cost of living in their own district, they’d be far less enthusiastic. For example a minimum wage of $7.25 in Kansas City might translate to $14 per hour in New York City.
The theory helps to explain how wage hikes, while highly popular with the public, always tend to stay within some reasonable bounds. While not in favor of such hikes, Slivinski nonetheless implies that politicians are clued in to the deleterious economic consequences of these wage hikes. This argument is comforting, but it does ignore some considerations.
States vary in their costs of living just like Congressional Districts. And, states pass their own minimum wage laws just like the Federal government. If Slivinksi is right, we would expect the minimum wage rates in states to correlate with their costs of living. But they don’t, or at least not very closely.
For example, according to a comparative salary calculator, a 72K salary in West Virginia is equivalent to a 100K salary in New Hampshire. Cost of living indexes show that West Virgina is about 25% less expensive than New Hampshire. Clearly, the cost of living in Mountain State is lower than in that of the Granite State. And yet, West Virginia passed a minimum wage of $7.25, effective in 2008. Meanwhile, New Hampshire’s is $5.15.
Policy makers may not be quite so illuminated on the subject of minimum wages after all. Their behavior seems to depend as much on the social and political attitudes in their particular district and states, as much as is does on market wages or costs-of-living. Ideas matter, and in particular ideas that are held by voters.
Unless free marketeers can convince many more Americans of the harm of wage controls to the overall economy, any big changes in public opinion are unlikely. I’m not holding my breath. The economics are complicated enough for the lay person, and academic dissent further muddies the waters. My guess is that as long as most Americans are sellers of labor, and not either self-employed or employers themselves, then support for labor price floors will be high. Only some wild changes in the economy with a radical downward shift in the average size of firms, and an explosion in the number of of entrepreneurs and employers would likely make any difference.
And, it doesn’t really matter which political party is in power. When Republican controlled Congress, they kept the issue off the table. However, they never really tried to educate the public, or challenge its conventional wisdom. And, since party control of the government is bound to fluctuate in a democracy, once Democrats regained power, they were sure to make up for lost time in their wage increase.
As a result, an alignment of libertarian minded voters, free marketeers and employers with the Republican party won’t make much difference for minimum wages over the long haul. Alignment with the Democrats probably won’t either. But the latter could gradually foster a more open minded attitude in the Democratic party towards to those who worry sincerely about the perverse consequences of labor market interventions. It could also encourage free marketeers to get more serious about ideas for helping the working poor, something they’ve been long divorced from in their relationship with the GOP.
Not surprisingly, all House Democrats voted for the bill, with none raising any concerns about its implications. Moreover, 82 Republicans, or just over 40% of House GOPers supported the hike as well. It’s an article of faith, not just amongst the progressive left, but broad segments of the public, that one of the greatest mechanisms for improving the living standards of the working poor is through government legislation of a wage floor.
Unfortunately, it is also long-standing conventional wisdom among the broad majority of economists that minimum wage laws can result in structural unemployment.
When wage floors are set below what low-wage workers already earn, they have no real consequence one way or the other. They cause no harm, but also provide no real benefits, either. When wages are set above what low-wage earners, however, then the minimum wage starts to make a difference, for better or for worse. Some clearly benefit from the higher salary. For other workers, however, there can be unintended consequences, as standard economic theory suggests that jobs at the low end are ultimately shed when mandated wages exceed market wages.
In 1997, however, two economists David Card and Andrew Kruger, questioned this aforementioned basic economic conventional wisdom in Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage. They suggested that in their New Jersey case study, a higher minimum wage did not lead to an increase in unemployment.
Since then, their work has been criticized, but also routinely cited by wage hike advocates. Some activists have gone so far in their advocacy of intervention in labor markets as to suggest that it is “proven” that minimum wage laws can be raised ever upward with no negative consequences. In a recent radio interview, Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT), without citing Card-Kruger, argued that minimum wages are a scientifically proven, unalloyed good.
This optimistic notion, however, was slammed by Paul Krugman in 1998, who countered that at high enough levels wage floors are certain to do damage. He even scrutinized and questioned their rationale altogether. Meanwhile, economist Brad DeLong walks the fence. He supports minimum wage laws, but simultaneously acknowledges their potential to hinder employment. In a blog post last Sunday, he argued approvingly for the minimum wage hike but suggested that policy makers, “Try not to push it to the point where its drawbacks grow too large.” Unfortunately, DeLong offers no advice or guidance on how much is too much. Most economists, meanwhile, are with Krugman.
A recent story in the Washington Post, for example, noted that Congress, “brushed aside some corporate concerns” to pass the new minimum wage. The inference here is that only behemoth corporations had anything to lose from wage hikes, and that only elites at behemoth corporations have raised any intellectual objections.
Coverage like this helps to convince activists that government economic controls come free of side effects, and also nutures the image of a zero sum game battle between the working public and “corporations” over wages, work hours, sick leave, vacations, medical leave, heathcare benefits and pensions.
So why don’t we see even higher minimum wages? Steven Slivinski of the Cato Institute has an interesting and plausible theory as to why policy makers widely favor minimum wage floors, but stop at say, $7.25 per hour rather than going up to $20 an hour. He speculates that minimum wages only make politicians wary when they start to approach the market wages in their own Districts. When tiny hikes are proposed, only a few politicians in low cost of living areas object. As the rate moves higher, however, more and more object until a near majority feel threatened by the rate, and the proposed hike goes no higher.
Slivinksi suggests that if politicians were required to index the minimum wage to the cost of living in their own district, they’d be far less enthusiastic. For example a minimum wage of $7.25 in Kansas City might translate to $14 per hour in New York City.
The theory helps to explain how wage hikes, while highly popular with the public, always tend to stay within some reasonable bounds. While not in favor of such hikes, Slivinski nonetheless implies that politicians are clued in to the deleterious economic consequences of these wage hikes. This argument is comforting, but it does ignore some considerations.
States vary in their costs of living just like Congressional Districts. And, states pass their own minimum wage laws just like the Federal government. If Slivinksi is right, we would expect the minimum wage rates in states to correlate with their costs of living. But they don’t, or at least not very closely.
For example, according to a comparative salary calculator, a 72K salary in West Virginia is equivalent to a 100K salary in New Hampshire. Cost of living indexes show that West Virgina is about 25% less expensive than New Hampshire. Clearly, the cost of living in Mountain State is lower than in that of the Granite State. And yet, West Virginia passed a minimum wage of $7.25, effective in 2008. Meanwhile, New Hampshire’s is $5.15.
Policy makers may not be quite so illuminated on the subject of minimum wages after all. Their behavior seems to depend as much on the social and political attitudes in their particular district and states, as much as is does on market wages or costs-of-living. Ideas matter, and in particular ideas that are held by voters.
Unless free marketeers can convince many more Americans of the harm of wage controls to the overall economy, any big changes in public opinion are unlikely. I’m not holding my breath. The economics are complicated enough for the lay person, and academic dissent further muddies the waters. My guess is that as long as most Americans are sellers of labor, and not either self-employed or employers themselves, then support for labor price floors will be high. Only some wild changes in the economy with a radical downward shift in the average size of firms, and an explosion in the number of of entrepreneurs and employers would likely make any difference.
And, it doesn’t really matter which political party is in power. When Republican controlled Congress, they kept the issue off the table. However, they never really tried to educate the public, or challenge its conventional wisdom. And, since party control of the government is bound to fluctuate in a democracy, once Democrats regained power, they were sure to make up for lost time in their wage increase.
As a result, an alignment of libertarian minded voters, free marketeers and employers with the Republican party won’t make much difference for minimum wages over the long haul. Alignment with the Democrats probably won’t either. But the latter could gradually foster a more open minded attitude in the Democratic party towards to those who worry sincerely about the perverse consequences of labor market interventions. It could also encourage free marketeers to get more serious about ideas for helping the working poor, something they’ve been long divorced from in their relationship with the GOP.
Friday, January 12, 2007
Fantasyland Iraq
In his Wednesday speech, president Bush characterized the situation Iraq as a conflict between, “extremists who kill” and “those who believe in freedom and moderation.” Were it only so. In that moment, the president went from being merely stubborn and out of touch to constructing and inhabiting his own personal alternate reality.
There are forces of terror to be sure. A Sunni insurgency, aided by Al Qaeda and the international jihad, assisted by Syria, Iran, private citizens in Saudi Arabia, and maybe many others. This insurgency finds a welcoming enough home in Baghdad and Anbar, probably even more welcoming since the bombing in Samarra and the hanging of Saddam. The majority of rank and file Sunnis support attacks on American soldiers.
On the other side, however, are not Madison, Jefferson and their liberty-loving merry men. It’s a fragile government coalition of religious conservative Shiite parties, most with their own extra governmental militias, death squads, revered Ayatollahs, and ties to Iran. A near majority of this group’s public favor attacks on American soldiers. These are the freedom loving moderates.
I’m certain that there must be some in Iraq who favor a unified, peaceful, reconciled, secular, liberal, pluralistic, Western-tolerant democracy. But what’s telling is just how little this viewpoint seems to manifest itself in the Iraqi polity. If there are masses who share this vision, then why don’t they show up in polls? Where are their media organs? their politicians? their rallies?
We can only conclude that their numbers must be thin, and must have gotten thinner given the mass departures from the country over the last few years. They probably got thinner still in an atmosphere of civil war which encourages alignment with more violent and polar forces. For president Bush to suggest that this outlook represents the outlook of the average Iraqi is the grandest of delusions.
The surge strategy is based on the idea that Iraq has a center, that the Maliki government is that center, and that the center can gradually expand to take in the entirety of Iraqi society, marginalizing terrorists and militias. Again, this seems wishful thinking.
If the U.S. focuses its efforts on hammering the Sunni insurgency, it may take another Fallujah or two to have any desired effect. And how long with the Sunni Arab world allow the Sunnis in Iraq to get hammered without amping up their own assistance, be it private or state sponsored; financial or jihadist. We risk getting drawn into what was dubbed the “80% solution” in which we effectively take the Shiite side in the civil war with potentially calamitous repercussions.
On the other hand, if we pressure the Shiites to make a political deal on the Sunni’s behalf, or confront Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army or other Shiite militias, then we risk further alienating the Shiites with little corresponding rise in support from Sunni. If we handle things especially incompetently or get unlucky, we may end up unifying all factions virgorously against us.
There are massive, undisclosed risks to the surge, beyond simply more blood and treasure. Moreover, there is also a serious silver lining to “failure”. That Al-Qaeda and Iran are thoroughly at odds in Iraq is one of the most underreported stories in the MSM. When your enemies want to fight one another, its generally wise strategy to get out of the way.
There are forces of terror to be sure. A Sunni insurgency, aided by Al Qaeda and the international jihad, assisted by Syria, Iran, private citizens in Saudi Arabia, and maybe many others. This insurgency finds a welcoming enough home in Baghdad and Anbar, probably even more welcoming since the bombing in Samarra and the hanging of Saddam. The majority of rank and file Sunnis support attacks on American soldiers.
On the other side, however, are not Madison, Jefferson and their liberty-loving merry men. It’s a fragile government coalition of religious conservative Shiite parties, most with their own extra governmental militias, death squads, revered Ayatollahs, and ties to Iran. A near majority of this group’s public favor attacks on American soldiers. These are the freedom loving moderates.
I’m certain that there must be some in Iraq who favor a unified, peaceful, reconciled, secular, liberal, pluralistic, Western-tolerant democracy. But what’s telling is just how little this viewpoint seems to manifest itself in the Iraqi polity. If there are masses who share this vision, then why don’t they show up in polls? Where are their media organs? their politicians? their rallies?
We can only conclude that their numbers must be thin, and must have gotten thinner given the mass departures from the country over the last few years. They probably got thinner still in an atmosphere of civil war which encourages alignment with more violent and polar forces. For president Bush to suggest that this outlook represents the outlook of the average Iraqi is the grandest of delusions.
The surge strategy is based on the idea that Iraq has a center, that the Maliki government is that center, and that the center can gradually expand to take in the entirety of Iraqi society, marginalizing terrorists and militias. Again, this seems wishful thinking.
If the U.S. focuses its efforts on hammering the Sunni insurgency, it may take another Fallujah or two to have any desired effect. And how long with the Sunni Arab world allow the Sunnis in Iraq to get hammered without amping up their own assistance, be it private or state sponsored; financial or jihadist. We risk getting drawn into what was dubbed the “80% solution” in which we effectively take the Shiite side in the civil war with potentially calamitous repercussions.
On the other hand, if we pressure the Shiites to make a political deal on the Sunni’s behalf, or confront Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army or other Shiite militias, then we risk further alienating the Shiites with little corresponding rise in support from Sunni. If we handle things especially incompetently or get unlucky, we may end up unifying all factions virgorously against us.
There are massive, undisclosed risks to the surge, beyond simply more blood and treasure. Moreover, there is also a serious silver lining to “failure”. That Al-Qaeda and Iran are thoroughly at odds in Iraq is one of the most underreported stories in the MSM. When your enemies want to fight one another, its generally wise strategy to get out of the way.
Tuesday, January 9, 2007
How Trade Helps Public Sector Unions
It’s not surprising that many labor organizations oppose trade liberalization. After all, while reducing tarriff barriers can benefit their membership as consumers, they can also threaten to expose their members to more foreign competition. This competition, in turn, can lead to accelerated job loses in certain sectors. And, promoting job security is job one for labor.
What is surprising, however, is how public sector labor organizations like AFSCME or SEIU line up unquestioningly with their labor comrades in opposing pacts like NAFTA and CAFTA. After all, bringing down tariffs on imported sugar, steel or textiles is not going to threaten the jobs of cops, nurses, firefighters, building inspectors, bus drivers or most other city or county employees. These types of jobs are remarkably resistant to outsourcing or to competitive threats from abroad.
Moreover, expanded trade can actually lead to marked job increases and opportunities in the government sector. As one of the few policy tools that can reliably benefit broad masses of the public, trade expands the nation’s overall wealth. And, a wealthier nation tends to mean more public sector jobs.
While politicians and pundits across the spectrum debate the merits of public services, government spending as a percentage of GDP has tended to remain fairly constant. So, when GDP grows, the public sector grows with along with it. Thus, with economic growth, government becomes a type of growth industry itself, riding on the productivity gains made in other, more dynamic sectors.
For this reason, it is senseless for an organization that represents public employees to oppose trade expansion. It works directly against the long term interests of its members. Why would they do this? I can only guess that it comes down to some kind of labor “solidarity”, or the desire to help other unions even when its works against one’s own members and is not reciprocated. Or, the opposition is part of a deeply rooted and erroneous populist dogma which holds that only “corporations” benefit from trade. Either way, the members of these public sector unions are being very poorly served by their anti-trade leaders. It’s time for the rank and file to start speaking truth to power.
What is surprising, however, is how public sector labor organizations like AFSCME or SEIU line up unquestioningly with their labor comrades in opposing pacts like NAFTA and CAFTA. After all, bringing down tariffs on imported sugar, steel or textiles is not going to threaten the jobs of cops, nurses, firefighters, building inspectors, bus drivers or most other city or county employees. These types of jobs are remarkably resistant to outsourcing or to competitive threats from abroad.
Moreover, expanded trade can actually lead to marked job increases and opportunities in the government sector. As one of the few policy tools that can reliably benefit broad masses of the public, trade expands the nation’s overall wealth. And, a wealthier nation tends to mean more public sector jobs.
While politicians and pundits across the spectrum debate the merits of public services, government spending as a percentage of GDP has tended to remain fairly constant. So, when GDP grows, the public sector grows with along with it. Thus, with economic growth, government becomes a type of growth industry itself, riding on the productivity gains made in other, more dynamic sectors.
For this reason, it is senseless for an organization that represents public employees to oppose trade expansion. It works directly against the long term interests of its members. Why would they do this? I can only guess that it comes down to some kind of labor “solidarity”, or the desire to help other unions even when its works against one’s own members and is not reciprocated. Or, the opposition is part of a deeply rooted and erroneous populist dogma which holds that only “corporations” benefit from trade. Either way, the members of these public sector unions are being very poorly served by their anti-trade leaders. It’s time for the rank and file to start speaking truth to power.
Monday, January 8, 2007
Our "Works Progress Administration" in Iraq
As the president gets set to reveal his new strategy for Iraq, we’ve learned that it includes a billion dollars for job training and make-work programs to help unemployed Iraqis. Frustrated by the stubbornness of the violence and chaos, military commanders are seeking to bring unemployment down, seeing it as a major contributor to the insurgency.
It may well be, and the Pentagon’s frustration is understandable. But isn’t anarchy and sectarian violence a major contributor to unemployment? The two surely work in tandem with a negative feedback dynamic. If we were going to stop the cycle, with all due respect to the military commanders, one would think that creating a monopoly on violence would be an easier task for an occupying army than trying to control the Iraqi economy Keynesian style.
In fact, when histories are written on this conflict, future generations will surely conclude that the U.S. placed way too little emphasis on creating security and much too much emphasis on Iraqi public works projects and related programs. These have suffered from the sluggish release of funds, from the high cost of doing business in Iraq (due to the violence), from direct insurgent attacks, and from a not surprising high level of graft.
What, then, makes us think that more of these WPA projects for Iraq will have any efficacy at all? Surely, if they were proposed for inner-city urban American they would be roundly denounced in neo-conservative circles. What makes us think that government directed job programs with vague goals, administered by U.S. bureaucrats and filtered through Iraq during a civil war are the policy scalpel that’s going to bring down unemployment, and thereby cripple the insurgency, and thereby reduce sectarian tensions in Iraq ?
There is no credible philosophical basis for it whatsoever. Nor is there any heartening precedent. Over the last four years, we’ve been pumping billions of dollars into Iraq for public works projects with apparently little beneficial effect on the overall security situation or our reputation.
Moreover, even if you are a deep believer in the healing power of U.S guided public spending programs in Iraq, what can 1 billion possibly accomplish ? It’s chump change. We’ve lost more than 8 to 9 times that in funds that are completely unaccounted for – and shrugged it off as just the cost of doing business.
I’ll wait for the speech on Wednesday night, but its sounds like this component of the president’s plan merely allows him to play off his strategy as "comprehensive". It’s just another ornament on a withering tree.
It may well be, and the Pentagon’s frustration is understandable. But isn’t anarchy and sectarian violence a major contributor to unemployment? The two surely work in tandem with a negative feedback dynamic. If we were going to stop the cycle, with all due respect to the military commanders, one would think that creating a monopoly on violence would be an easier task for an occupying army than trying to control the Iraqi economy Keynesian style.
In fact, when histories are written on this conflict, future generations will surely conclude that the U.S. placed way too little emphasis on creating security and much too much emphasis on Iraqi public works projects and related programs. These have suffered from the sluggish release of funds, from the high cost of doing business in Iraq (due to the violence), from direct insurgent attacks, and from a not surprising high level of graft.
What, then, makes us think that more of these WPA projects for Iraq will have any efficacy at all? Surely, if they were proposed for inner-city urban American they would be roundly denounced in neo-conservative circles. What makes us think that government directed job programs with vague goals, administered by U.S. bureaucrats and filtered through Iraq during a civil war are the policy scalpel that’s going to bring down unemployment, and thereby cripple the insurgency, and thereby reduce sectarian tensions in Iraq ?
There is no credible philosophical basis for it whatsoever. Nor is there any heartening precedent. Over the last four years, we’ve been pumping billions of dollars into Iraq for public works projects with apparently little beneficial effect on the overall security situation or our reputation.
Moreover, even if you are a deep believer in the healing power of U.S guided public spending programs in Iraq, what can 1 billion possibly accomplish ? It’s chump change. We’ve lost more than 8 to 9 times that in funds that are completely unaccounted for – and shrugged it off as just the cost of doing business.
I’ll wait for the speech on Wednesday night, but its sounds like this component of the president’s plan merely allows him to play off his strategy as "comprehensive". It’s just another ornament on a withering tree.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)